On July 30, thousands of people began arriving in Ceuta, a Spanish exclave in North Africa that borders Morocco. The number reached nearly 60,000 people within just 24 hours. Although exact figures were never known, the number reached nearly 72,000 people within a couple of days of the initial influx. The profile of this mass migration showed that most of those arriving were young men between the ages of 18 and 25, accompanied by a smaller number of minors and women. Even this profile suggested from the outset that these people were seeking better living conditions, primarily due to limited economic opportunities, inadequate employment prospects and persistent inequalities that were deepening social divisions in Morocco.

This massive influx was met with a harsh response from the Spanish government and authorities, who pushed back approximately 70,000 migrants to where they had come from. The remaining 2,000 were mostly minors who, under international law, were entitled to protection. Their cases were therefore required to be assessed individually by the Spanish authorities.

Of course, several theories circulated in academic circles and the media regarding the reasons behind this sudden influx. One plausible trigger was the Spanish Supreme Court’s judgment of June 29, concerning the treatment of migrants intercepted at sea while attempting to reach Ceuta and Melilla. The ruling did not authorize Spain to open its borders or guarantee migrants the right to remain in the country. Rather, it emphasized the need for greater procedural safeguards before migrants intercepted at sea could be returned. Nevertheless, human traffickers and smugglers reportedly misrepresented the judgment on social media, creating the impression that anyone who managed to reach Ceuta by sea would automatically be permitted to stay in Spain.

This was indeed a trigger for the influx, but there was a broader context that may have led people to believe that Spain was adopting a more lenient migration policy.

In January 2026, the government announced an extraordinary regularization program, which was approved by the Council of Ministers in April 2026. The program allows undocumented migrants who were already in Spain before Dec. 31, 2025, and who can demonstrate at least five months of residence and have no criminal record, to apply for a one-year residence and work permit.

The Spanish government’s reasons for introducing this program were mainly economic and pragmatic. The government argued that the program would reduce informal employment and labor exploitation, address labor shortages in sectors such as agriculture, construction, hospitality, and care, increase tax and social security contributions, and integrate people already living and working in Spain into the formal economy.

However, the fact that this regularization program specifically targeted migrants from Latin American countries, who were considered more likely to integrate into Spanish society because of their shared language, was largely overlooked. Combined with the Supreme Court’s decision in June, this may have contributed to human smugglers and traffickers spreading disinformation on social media, misleading people in Morocco about the opportunities available to them in Spain.

Of course, how and why people were triggered to move in the first place is one thing; how they could move so easily across the border is another thing.

Many observers attributed the relatively unhindered movement of people to the apparent inaction of the Moroccan authorities. According to eyewitness accounts and media reports, Moroccan authorities appeared to turn a blind eye as people began moving toward Ceuta, reinforcing the impression that Spain indeed opened its borders.

For people interested in Morocco-Spain relations, this indeed may be true. Morocco has a history of using migration as a political weapon in its relationship with Spain based on their differences over sovereignty of Western Sahara.

In April 2021, Spain allowed Brahim Ghali, leader of the Polisario Front (which seeks independence for Western Sahara), to receive COVID-19 treatment in a Spanish hospital under an assumed identity. Morocco strongly objected, and in May 2021, Spain experienced a sudden mass migration when about 8,000 people entered Ceuta from Morocco within roughly 48 hours. Around the time of the Ceuta crossings, Moroccan security forces were reported to have relaxed enforcement at the border.

Relations gradually improved after Spain shifted its position in 2022 to support Morocco’s autonomy proposal for Western Sahara as the basis for resolving the dispute. Migration cooperation between the two countries subsequently resumed, and irregular crossings from Morocco to Spain declined for a period. However, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez’s visit to Algeria, a country that supports the Polisario Front, on July 20, 2026, may have created the impression in Morocco that Spain was softening its position toward the Polisario Front.

Although Spanish authorities never criticized the Moroccan side for the massive influx, there were some thoughts that Morocco could have repeated its instrumentalization of migration as a political weapon in its relationship with Spain, just as in 2021.

The effects of the influx of migrants into Ceuta on European Union member states demonstrated how migration is often perceived as a security risk across the EU. The episode highlighted the extent to which sudden and large-scale movements of people can be framed not only as a humanitarian or migration-management issue but also as a broader security concern. The Spanish interior minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska stressed many times that the Schengen Area had in no way been compromised, noting that Ceuta is outside the Schengen free-movement area even though it is Spanish territory.

Rather than demonstrating solidarity with a fellow member state, Italy, under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, temporarily reintroduced border controls on travel from Spain, suspending the Schengen arrangements between the two countries. In addition, 22 EU member states, coordinated by Italy and Denmark, submitted a joint appeal to the European Commission and the Council of the EU, calling for an urgent meeting of EU interior ministers to coordinate a response to the situation.

The emergency video meeting of EU interior ministers did not result in binding new legislation or sanctions. Instead, it led to political agreement on several immediate measures and demonstrated broad support for Spain. The discussion subsequently shifted from criticism of Spain toward a more coordinated EU response, stronger external border management and enhanced cooperation with Morocco. However, because the meeting took place only after several member states had initially criticized Spain for pursuing allegedly lenient migration policies, weak border controls, and an inadequate response to the crisis, the solidarity and unity expected among EU member states appeared less convincing.

This brings us to a broader reality within the EU: Migration is increasingly perceived as a security risk and is being instrumentalized by several centrist and radical-right political leaders in member states, who are primarily concerned with maintaining public support ahead of upcoming elections. The episode also illustrates how national interests can take precedence over the principles of solidarity and common purpose within the EU when a serious crisis emerges.

Humanitarian factors, which are among the main reasons why people risk their lives to reach EU borders, are not discussed sufficiently. Instead, the focus remains largely on preserving the integrity of the EU and maintaining its characteristics as a closed security community. This reality is far removed from portraying the EU as a norm-based community founded to protect and promote certain principles. Rather, it suggests a community of states united around shared projects and values, but ultimately determined to protect their national interests, sometimes at the expense of solidarity when it is most needed.