India is losing West Asia, one country at a time. Even as the region undergoes a once-in-a-generation shift in its security architecture and political battle lines, it is unclear what India’s strategy is …or whether New Delhi has one at all.

It was not supposed to be this way. Just 10 years ago, India was rapidly remaking its footprint in West Asia. In 2016, Saudi Arabia awarded India’s Prime Minister its highest civilian honour. In 2021, the I2U2 agreement was signed binding India, Israel, the United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) together. In 2024, Iran leased Chabahar to India. All these successes though are now memories from the past.

Pakistan’s new diplomatic moment

In the last four months, the U.S.-Israel war with Iran has escalated into a catastrophic regional conflict with Iran attacking the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, the Saudis hitting Iraqi militias, Houthis attacking Saudi ships and Israel carrying out strikes in multiple countries. Now, the Gulf countries are rethinking the efficacy of the U.S. security umbrella. They see a threat from both Iran and Israel.

Among the Gulf countries there is a schism on how to handle this threat — through engagement (as the UAE is doing) or through deterrence (as the Saudis are contemplating).

In this context, Pakistan’s role as mediator in the U.S.-Iran conflict is gaining it reputational benefits in the region. Irrespective of Pakistan’s motives, analysts in the region see that Pakistan waded into the conflict at a time when it seemed that no one could bring U.S. President Donald Trump and the Iranians to the table despite efforts by Türkiye, Qatar and Egypt.

The latest collective defence pact in Mecca between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan comes in this context. This pact may mean less in shaping the U.S.-Iran war as none of these countries is likely to directly take on Iran alongside the U.S. The pact is thus aimed less at Iran and more at deterring Israel. All three countries see themselves as the next target of Israel after Iran. They thus want to pool Saudi capital, Pakistan’s military strength, and Türkiye’s technological advances.

This is a challenge for India. A future war between Israel and Pakistan will inevitably draw in India given the close partnership between Israel and India. Similarly, even greater Turkish support for Pakistan in a future conflict that Pakistan might have with India cannot be ruled out

The choices before India

What then is India’s strategy? It appears to be confident of Israel’s victory in its various battles in the region given its proximity to the U.S. But U.S. politics are changing rapidly, with both ‘Make America Great Again’ Republicans and Democratic Socialists questioning the once-unquestioned U.S. support for Israel. Can Israel then emerge triumphant alone?

India has cultivated a special relationship with the UAE given the importance of remittances from Indian expat workers in the country, the investments by the Indian elite in the UAE and the UAE’s strategic investments in India. But the UAE’s mounting differences with Saudi Arabia are a cause for concern, as are its positions against UN-recognised governments in conflicts as afar as Sudan. Can the UAE emerge unscathed in all these conflicts?

India can choose to sign military alliances with Israel and the UAE. But this would hurt what is left of India’s relationship with Iran and Saudi Arabia. India can choose to do nothing as it is doing now. And its merchant mariners may keep getting killed in the Strait of Hormuz while more Indian ships may sink in the Bab-el-Mandeb.

A great power in the making risks appearing humbled and hobbled in its immediate maritime neighbourhood.

Or, India can pick a third way. It can devise an active regional political strategy. Re-engage the Saudis with whom it has no explicit differences.

It can start playing a role of rebuilding trust between the Arab countries and Iran, starting with the UAE-Iran relationship. It can engage in Jordan’s security offering Jordan defensive technologies at a time when U.S. munitions are running low. It can engage in the future UN peacekeeping role in Lebanon, which is now under a cloud, with the forecast being an end to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). It can even run a back-channel with Türkiye sharing its red lines about its relationship with Pakistan. If India cannot join the new Saudi-led maritime force for the Red Sea, it can work with Egypt on a parallel effort to safeguard India-bound shipping, from the Suez Canal to Bab-el-Mandeb. It can look into setting up a military presence in the Red Sea region whether in Somaliland or Socotra. Building on current military training exchanges, it can start drills and military exercises with a range of countries in the region.

Think of bridge-building

India can also appoint a new Special Envoy for West Asia — not one focused on the Israel-Palestine peace process necessarily, but one who can draw all the threads together to secure India’s interests in the region at a time of unprecedented turbulence. All of this can be part of one pro-active vision for India to support a new security architecture for West Asia — one that does not draw new battle lines but instead contributes to trust-building.

India cannot afford to be a stranger to West Asia. India has both the capacity and the responsibility to help restore peace and predictability in the region.

Raja Karthikeya is Adjunct Fellow and Lead for West Asia Studies at the Takshashila Institution

Published - August 17, 2026 12:08 am IST