Commentary: America’s reassurances about the Indo-Pacific leave room for doubt

Washington’s words and actions invite questions about whether its strategic view of the Indo-Pacific region has changed, says RSIS’ Sinderpal Singh.

SINGAPORE: In his first official trip to Southeast Asia, US Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby stressed that America is more engaged than ever in the Indo-Pacific.

However, the top Pentagon adviser added that US investment in the region is “coupled with a newfound but common-sense expectation of much greater effort and contribution by our allies and partners”.

Mr Colby also doubled down on his criticism of middle power alliances that exclude the US, arguing that efforts to ramp up defence capabilities need to integrate and complement America’s.

Such qualifications to US commitments in the Indo-Pacific may give observers pause. Moreover, news emerged last month that the US Indo-Pacific Command, the oldest and largest of America’s combatant commands, has reverted to its former title of the US Pacific Command.

This invites questions about whether Washington’s strategic view of the Indo-Pacific region has changed. How should the world interpret the dropping of “Indo” from “Indo-Pacific”?

REFERENCES TO A GLORIFIED PAST

Under the second Trump administration, there has been a drive to rename institutions and departments to reflect its break from earlier administrations as well as connect to an idealised, glorified US military past.

In this regard, the restoration of the US Pacific Command’s original designation hearkens back to America’s World War II victory. The Pacific Command was formed in 1947 in the aftermath of the Pacific War, establishing a US-led security architecture in the region.

It also augments the Trump administration’s efforts to represent itself as restoring historical US greatness that had been wilfully impeded by previous US administrations.

It is ironic that the US Pacific Command was rebranded as the US Indo-Pacific Command during Trump’s first term. This demonstrates a distinction between the two Trump administrations: The second Trump administration favours direct deal-making, rather than working with other countries within regional frameworks.

SHARPENED FOCUS ON EAST ASIA

It could be argued that the US Pacific Command more accurately reflects its area of operation, which in reality covers little of the Indian Ocean.

During a media briefing on Aug 13, Mr Colby said the name change reflects the US military’s strategic focus on the first island chain – which stretches from Japan and Taiwan to the Philippines and Borneo.

This suggests that the US seeks to secure its interests in East Asia, in the context of an economically and militarily rising China.

However, this apparent refocus on East Asia has not provided substantial reassurance to US partners and allies in the region.

On Monday (Aug 17), US President Donald Trump announced his intention to scale back joint military drills with South Korea, because they send an “inappropriate and hostile” signal to North Korea.

Meanwhile, the US Pacific Air Forces is evaluating exercises in the region to maintain “readiness” for other military commitments, including in the Middle East. This raises questions for friends and allies in East Asia about the US’s priorities against the backdrop of the conflict with Iran.

ROLE OF INDIA

Another factor underlying the shift in America’s Indo-Pacific outlook is the role of India. The first Trump administration adopted the Indo-Pacific framework to involve India in counterbalancing China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean – but the threats emanating from the Indian Ocean are significantly different for Washington and Delhi.

For the US, much of the Indian Ocean is not about dealing with China but rather threats in the Middle East and Africa, such as Iran and its proxies, terrorism concerns and potential attacks on US personnel.

For India, however, the Indian and Pacific oceans represent a contiguous strategic region defined by a rising China. Delhi is concerned about expanding Chinese naval presence, as well as Beijing gaining clout with governments in the region via economic outreach.

This disparity in perceptions between the two countries may also explain the impulse by the US to revert to the old Pacific Command name. Tensions between the two countries related to trade and tariffs have also not helped dampen anti-American sentiments in India.

INDO-PACIFIC FRAMEWORK REMAINS SALIENT FOR OTHER STATES

For other states in the region, the Indo-Pacific continues to serve as an accurate spatial rendition of the threats they face.

China’s increasing economic, military and diplomatic influence has made the Indian and Pacific oceans increasingly interconnected for Beijing’s interests.

This is exemplified by its “two-ocean strategy”, linked to the Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to secure sea lanes across these oceans to protect energy imports and economic growth.

For states such as India, Japan and Australia, this growing Chinese footprint makes the Indo-Pacific a single strategic space.

Even for states in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia, interests in the Indian and Pacific oceans are merging. They would seek to respond to the security challenges posed by great power competition across these two oceans.

For Indonesia, the security of its western approaches has become a strategic concern, largely due to perceptions of China’s expanding “grey-zone” activities around the Natuna Islands.

The Indo-Pacific architecture initially championed by the first Trump administration has narrowed to the Western Pacific, reflecting the domestic and foreign policy imperatives of Trump 2.0.

However, the utility of the Indo-Pacific will remain for states in the region due to the increasing convergence of security threats across the two oceans, posed by China’s growing presence and the resultant great power competition.

Dr Sinderpal Singh is Assistant Director and Coordinator of the South Asia Programme and Regional Security Architecture Programme at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.