India’s theatre-isation is nearing completion. The United States, the United Kingdom, and China have already made this shift: modern conflict favours integrated structures over single-service models. India is now moving in the same direction. The transition, however, may temporarily reduce operational readiness. The key question is what will be lost, how much, and for how long before capability is restored.

Transforming a single-service structure that has stood for seven decades is difficult. The merger of 17 single-service commands into three integrated theatres carries three real risks.

First, the knowledge gap at the top. A theatre commander will command forces from three services, at least two of which he has not spent decades honing. Staff can advise, but it cannot replace the instincts built over a career — knowing how quickly a mechanised brigade mobilises or a fighter squadron scrambles. In a fast-paced conflict such as Operation Sindoor (2025), that gap becomes critical when domain expertise matters most.

Second, each service has unique values and cultures — merging them is difficult, which will show up sharpest around careers and rank. A joint force worried about career progression or rank-equivalence — hurting morale and motivation — can dampen active combat.

Third, slower decision-making. Adding the Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS), alongside the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), adds a layer between the theatre commanders and the Raksha Mantri — one more link between order and action. Theatre commanders are to report directly to the Raksha Mantri once fighting starts. But an untested structure cannot suddenly switch on under fire, and peacetime habits of routing through the VCDS would be hard to break when speed matters most.

None of this argues against theatre commands; the reform must proceed. All three hit short-term readiness first, with no time to recover once fighting starts. The risk compounds; gaps in data links, jointness and logistics rarely surface until a crisis forces the question. India’s Air Force chief has argued that coordination may serve better than forcing fusion too fast. The next question is how much this costs, and for how long.

How much and for how long

Here is a rough but useful distinction. First, the nature of change. Reforms touching weapon-platforms show results within months; those touching structures such as the Andaman and Nicobar Command took over a decade. Theatre-isation is the second category — who commands what, and how fast the three services fuse as one fighting system – and that costs readiness.

Second, the scale of the delay. The current plan may take two to three years, while full transition could take a decade or more. China created theatre commands in two years and the U.S. in 10; India has spent 25 years debating the move. The real challenge is not money or hardware, but mindsets — hierarchy, authority, and command structures. Even the U.K. restructured its joint command twice since 2012. For India, the risk is reduced readiness along the borders during transition.

Third, the timing. India faces pressure on two fronts — an unresolved boundary with China, a festering rivalry with Pakistan. A long war gives theatre-isation time to mature; a short one runs on whatever readiness is on hand. China raised five theatre commands in 2016; the one facing India was tested at Doklam in 2017, and in 2020. The Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986), a success after its first test in Panama, spent a decade absorbing its readiness costs — diluted expertise, command friction.

Indian defence planning just treats reform as self-executing: approve the structure, allocate roles, and assume readiness follows. Beijing shows otherwise: it took two years to raise five theatre commands .

The gap is partly procedural and partly semantic. India still speaks of “defence preparedness”; modern militaries focus on “military readiness” — staying ready, always. India has yet to develop a military readiness framework. It needs one now, along with four key reforms.

First, the metrics — a public statement of what the joint force must be ready to fight is essential. Naming these readiness risks matters. A “two-front” threat can quietly become “two-and-a-half” if left unaddressed. No one in India has said this openly.

Second, the standards that measure force structures against operational demands. India measures inputs — money, manpower, machines, and material (4Ms) — rather than actual military capability. A readiness standard needs three elements: unit-level readiness, force readiness, and sustainability with surge capacity. The transition window will not wait.

Third, India needs mechanisms that compel policymakers to notice and act. The U.S. created a Readiness Oversight Council in the 1990s. India needs a similar structure: a Defence Readiness Council at the ministry level, a Military Readiness Committee under the CDS, and sub-committees within each service and theatre command.

Fourth, hedge the transition itself. Keep a reserve force outside the new structure so short wars are not fought entirely on untested ground. Diplomacy with China and Pakistan may not resolve long-standing disputes, but it can buy the time theatre-isation requires. Neither guarantees peace, but both create valuable time.

Theatre-isation is not the problem, but assuming it comes at no cost is. Readiness is what is at stake, and war does not wait for the transition to finish.

Harinder Singh is Former Director, Operational Logistics, at the Army Headquarters

Published - July 30, 2026 12:08 am IST