Bail for Revilla: The pall of judicial doubt

The Sandiganbayan was legally entitled to grant former Sen. Ramon “Bong” Revilla Jr. bail. That point must be conceded if criticism is to be responsible. Although malversation in the amount alleged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and bail is therefore not a matter of right, the Constitution permits release when the evidence of guilt is not strong. A bail hearing is not a trial, and provisional liberty is not an acquittal.

But judicial correctness does not require civic silence. The divided decision deserves scrutiny because courts are judged not only by whether they can identify a legal basis for an outcome but also by whether their reasoning appears coherent, evenhanded, and persuasive.

Revilla is charged in connection with an alleged P92.8-million “ghost” flood control project in Pandi, Bulacan. The Sandiganbayan majority allowed him to post P1-million bail, while denying bail to former officials of the Bulacan 1st District Engineering Office after finding the evidence against them strong. That contrast is the decision’s most troubling feature.

Article continues after this advertisement

Individualized assessment is essential. Conspiracy does not erase the prosecution’s duty to prove each accused’s participation. It is legally possible for the evidence to be weak against an alleged project proponent but strong against officials who certified, processed, or released payments. Yet the more counterintuitive the distinction, the heavier the court’s burden to explain it.

Associate Justice Karl Miranda’s dissent exposes the difficulty. He argued that Revilla’s role was “indispensable” to the alleged criminal design. He cited testimony identifying Revilla as the project proponent, together with a Department of Public Works and Highways list bearing the heading “For Funding Sen. Bong Revilla.” Miranda reasoned that facilitating inclusion in the budget need not mean personally intervening during congressional deliberations; it could include earlier acts that initiated or enabled the project’s funding.

The dissent also placed the alleged transaction within a broader “kalakaran”: projects were identified and funded, a percentage was reserved as a commitment or commission, and the resulting shortage was allegedly concealed through false accomplishment reports and supporting documents. Miranda found it “difficult to justify” releasing the person alleged to have benefited while keeping subordinate co-accused detained despite no proof, at this stage, that they gained from the scheme.

A dissent does not prove that the majority was dishonest or legally wrong. Neither public anger nor the Ombudsman’s suspicions can substitute for evidence of judicial interference. Courts must be protected from political threats, including pressure from officials demanding conviction or detention.

Article continues after this advertisement

But independence is not immunity from criticism. Indeed, judicial independence becomes credible only when accompanied by judicial accountability: transparent reasoning, consistency with precedent, disclosure of recusals and conflicts, and equal treatment of comparable litigants.

This is where the concept of judicial confidence risk becomes important. A court may reach a legally permissible result and still damage public confidence when it creates the appearance that political prominence produces exceptional relief. Such risk is especially high in the Philippines, where affluent defendants can sustain years of litigation, pursue every interlocutory remedy, and survive delays that crush ordinary accused persons.

Revilla’s history deepens that risk. He was acquitted of plunder in the Priority Development Assistance Fund case while co-accused Richard Cambe and Janet Lim Napoles were convicted. The judgment also imposed civil liability connected with the diverted funds, an aspect whose enforcement has remained unsuccessful. None of this proves guilt in the new case. It does, however, explain why another interlocutory ruling is received not as an isolated technical decision but as part of a longer national experience of incomplete accountability.

Article continues after this advertisement

The answer is not to abolish bail or presume guilt. It is to require a stronger right-to-reasons rule for high-public-interest cases. When one alleged conspirator is released and others remain jailed, the decision should identify, side by side, the evidence against each and explain why the constitutional threshold differs. Majority and dissenting opinions should be published promptly and in full. Trials should then proceed under firm timelines, because bail followed by endless delay becomes accountability deferred.

President Marcos may declare that he will not protect relatives or allies. That promise is welcome but insufficient. The judiciary is separate, and rightly so. The real test is whether critical institutions can get away with decisions that withstand sunlight.

The Sandiganbayan decision may ultimately prove defensible. For now, however, Miranda’s dissent raises questions the majority must answer more convincingly. Courts are not required to satisfy public anger. They are required to demonstrate that justice is not only independent but also intelligibly and equally administered.

—————-

doyromero@gmail.com