Commentary: Has Singapore reached a ‘when, not if’ moment for school attacks?

Singapore should prepare seriously for the possibility of a school attack, but that does not require turning schools into fortresses, says Kenneth Yeo from the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

SINGAPORE: It’s been drilled into us: A terror attack on Singapore is a matter of “when, not if”.

The disclosure on Jul 27 that three youths had been detained under the Internal Security Act for planning attacks in Singapore brought to light one particularly chilling case: A 14-year-old Secondary Two student was arrested in May, weeks before he intended to carry out a mass-casualty stabbing at his school during the June school holidays.

He had reportedly been influenced by Composite Violent Extremism (CoVE): a mixture of Islamic State propaganda, far-right extremism and fascination with mass shootings. The teen had prepared a 21-page manifesto detailing his attack plan and identified teachers and students as targets.

School attacks are not new, but a recent cluster of incidents suggests that they are no longer a predominantly American phenomenon.

In November 2025, a 17-year-old student allegedly detonated explosives in his Jakarta school, injuring 96 people. In February, an 18-year-old gunman stormed a school in southern Thailand, killing its principal and wounding a student. In June, two students aged 14 and 15 opened fire at a high school in the Philippines, killing three students and injuring at least 20 others.

The case of the 14-year-old boy inevitably raises a difficult question: If school attacks are not unthinkable, what does a “when, not if” mindset mean when it comes to keeping our children safe?

THE SECURITY PARADOX

School security is not only about preventing an attack. A school must be safe but also feel safe for it to function as a school.

The perception of a threat creates pressure for visible action. Once the learning environment is organised around fear, security begins to defeat its own purpose.

Mandatory bag checks and school drills against assailants may reassure students and parents that the danger is being taken seriously. Yet these same measures can make the threat feel more immediate.

Active-shooter drills, like those practised by millions of American students each year, illustrate this paradox: They may prepare students to respond during an attack, but they also require children to repeatedly imagine that a gunman could enter their classroom, which could institutionalise anxiety.

This underpins Senior Minister K Shanmugam’s response that we cannot “turn every school into a garrison”. Children should not be in an environment designed to remind them that they could be attacked.

WHAT DOES MEANINGFUL PREPAREDNESS LOOK LIKE?

The challenge, then, is how to strengthen security without allowing the machinery of security to dominate the experience of school.

This does not mean physical security is irrelevant. The key is to implement quiet layers of protection that make schools difficult to attack without making them difficult places for learning.

Schools need friendly but trained security personnel, sufficient CCTV coverage, sensible access controls and rehearsed evacuation procedures. These are invisible layers of security that could be masked as background routines to normalise habits without raising alarm.

Schools in Singapore already conduct emergency drills, such as fire, evacuation and lockdown drills – at least twice annually the Ministry of Education said in 2021 – for staff and students to rehearse the “run-hide-tell” principle. While these drills rehearse response against an active attacker, it should be approached in a calibrated manner to avoid making fear part of everyday school life.

Schools already have security measures in place, and each close call is a reminder that preparedness cannot become an exercise in simply going through the motions.

THE WARNING SIGNS

Yet, the most important layer of protection comes well before an attack is carried out - early detection. The strongest security system in a school is not a metal detector at the gate, but a person who recognises that something is wrong and chooses not to remain silent.

Extremist ideologies are increasingly diverse. A radicalised youth may not fit the familiar image of an ideological extremist. CoVE can combine ideologically diverse and incoherent beliefs – sometimes described as “salad bar” radicalisation.

This makes it difficult to identify radicalisation based on ideology alone. Yet the absence of a perfect indicator does not mean there are no warning signs.

In all three recent cases, the youths had reportedly shared extremist views or materials online or with people around them.

Schools should continue to pay attention to behaviours that suggest a teen may be mobilising towards violence: a fascination with violence, admiration for attackers and clear identification of targets. Individuals may attempt to recruit others, or share manifestoes or pledges of allegiances that suggests intent and capability.

Being a caring kaypoh (the local term for “busybody”) is different from profiling. The objective is to notice meaningful changes in behaviour and respond with concern, not to profile students based on superficial indicators. When suspicion turns into stereotypes, it weakens trust, fractures social cohesion and makes those who need help less willing to seek it.

A radicalised youth may also be a victim of circumstances, shaped by loneliness, grievance, manipulation and personal distress. Early intervention is therefore essential before vulnerability develops into violent intent.

Not every concern raised will point to radicalisation, and that is acceptable. Reporting should not be treated as an accusation, but as an act of care. A student who appears angry, isolated or fixated on violence may not be radicalised but will still need help.

OUR STRONGEST DEFENCE IS NOT A FORTRESS

No open society can promise absolute security. The more useful question is whether warning signs can be detected before violent intent becomes violent action.

The 14-year-old boy’s case was described as a “close shave”, but it was also evidence that intervention works. Someone in his school noticed the signs of radicalisation and alerted the authorities.

As uncomfortable as it might make us, a “when, not if” mindset should lead us to prepare seriously for the possibility of a school attack.

But our strongest defence as a society will not be fortress-like schools. It will be people and communities – attentive enough to notice when someone is in distress and willing to act before violence occurs.

Kenneth Yeo is an associate research fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies.