Powering Pax Silica: Can 3 GW be delivered without nuclear?

The Philippines faces a persistent energy security dilemma because of its heavy reliance on imported coal and liquefied natural gas (LNG). Nuclear power has been proposed as a potential baseload option because of its low carbon footprint and stable fuel costs. However, the country’s young geology and seismic activity pose unique challenges.

Historical experience with the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), unresolved waste management challenges and seismic risks indicate that nuclear energy is not viable under current conditions (Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, 2026; Ronin’s Grips, 2026).

Comparative analysis shows that renewables with storage remain the most affordable and resilient pathway, while LNG provides transitional reliability but at a high cost and with continued import dependence (Institute for Climate and Sustainable Cities, 2026; IRENA, 2022).

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The establishment of Pax Silica, a flagship semiconductor and artificial intelligence hub in New Clark City, requires 3 GW of embedded generation capacity, equivalent to 16% of Luzon’s current grid.

Meeting this demand requires a diversified energy mix. The optimal design is a renewable-heavy combination of 2 GW of solar power plus battery systems and 1 GW of LNG baseload capacity, balancing affordability, reliability and climate resilience.

This mix would deliver electricity at a weighted average cost of $85 to $95 per MWh, significantly cheaper than LNG alone, at about $155 per MWh, and nuclear power, at about $52 to $97 per MWh but with unresolved waste liabilities (Thunder Said Energy, 2025; Mendoza, 2026).

Land-use constraints, however, reshape its feasibility. Utility-scale solar requires about 10 hectares per MW under Philippine conditions (IRENA, 2022). Thus, 1 GW of solar requires about 10,000 hectares, while 2 GW requires about 20,000 hectares.

Pax Silica’s negotiated lease of 1,600 hectares cannot accommodate even 1 GW of conventional ground-mounted solar power. Within this footprint, only about 160 MW of solar capacity can realistically be deployed.

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To achieve the 2 GW target, Pax Silica must rely on off-site solar farms in Central Luzon, complemented by agrivoltaics, rooftop solar and cooperative land-use models to mitigate food-energy trade-offs.

The adjusted design therefore consists of about 160 MW of on-site solar power and battery storage within Pax Silica’s lease; about 1.84 GW of off-site solar power and battery storage in nearby provinces such as Tarlac, Pampanga and Nueva Ecija; and 1 GW of embedded LNG baseload capacity inside New Clark City.

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This hybrid strategy would provide reliability while accounting for land constraints. LNG baseload capacity becomes critical in balancing the shortfall, but its role should remain transitional as renewable energy capacity expands.

Nuclear power, while technically feasible, remains a last-resort option because of its high capital intensity of $6 billion to $10 billion per GW, unresolved high-level waste management costs of $500 million to $2.4 billion depending on the pathway, and accident risks that could exceed $10 billion (Rothwell, 2021; Scott, 2026).

The policy implications are clear:

• Prioritize renewable-heavy embedded generation with off-site solar expansion and battery storage.
• Embed LNG baseload plants to provide reliability during periods of solar intermittency.
• Treat nuclear power as a last resort, to be pursued only if renewable expansion fails.
• Integrate regional energy cooperation by leveraging ASEAN grid initiatives for surplus renewable energy imports.
• Enforce governance safeguards, including transparency, community benefit-sharing and strict emissions standards.

Pax Silica’s 3 GW demand can be met through a renewable-heavy hybrid design combining on-site solar, off-site cooperative solar farms and embedded LNG baseload capacity.

This pathway balances affordability, reliability and climate resilience while avoiding the fiscal and safety risks associated with nuclear power. Policymakers should prioritize renewables with storage and regional cooperation, ensuring that Pax Silica strengthens national energy security without undermining food security or climate commitments.

Nuclear power in the Philippines

The Philippines’ nuclear power debate is deeply rooted in its history of energy insecurity, beginning with the 1973 oil crisis and culminating in the costly but unused Bataan Nuclear Power Plant.

Past experience shows that while nuclear energy promises stable fuel costs and low carbon emissions, the country’s geology, governance challenges and high rehabilitation costs have repeatedly undermined its viability.

The Philippines has long struggled with energy security because of its dependence on imported coal and LNG. This vulnerability was first exposed during the 1973 oil crisis, when the Middle East oil embargo caused severe economic strain.

In response, President Ferdinand Marcos announced plans under martial law to build a nuclear power plant, envisioning nuclear energy as a way to reduce the country’s reliance on imported fuels (Nuclear power in the Philippines, 2022).

Construction of the BNPP began in 1976, with Westinghouse Electric contracted to build a 621 MW pressurized-water reactor.

Originally estimated to cost $500 million to $700 million, the project’s cost ballooned to $2.2 billion to $2.3 billion, making it one of the most expensive infrastructure projects in Philippine history (Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, 2026).

Despite its completion in 1984, the plant never operated because of safety concerns, corruption scandals and the global chilling effect of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.

President Corazon Aquino ultimately mothballed the BNPP, citing more than 4,000 safety defects and seismic risks in the area (Ronin’s Grips, 2026).

Globally, nuclear power is often justified by its low carbon footprint and stable fuel costs, making it attractive as a baseload option. However, the Philippines’ young geology and seismic activity pose unique challenges.

The BNPP sits near Mount Natib, a potentially active volcano, and along fault lines, raising concerns about catastrophic accidents that no engineering solution can fully mitigate (Ronin’s Grips, 2026).

Attempts to revive nuclear power have resurfaced periodically.

In 2011, the Fukushima disaster in Japan reignited public opposition. In 2022, President Rodrigo Duterte signed Executive Order No. 164, formally including nuclear power in the country’s energy mix as part of efforts to phase out coal.

More recently, feasibility studies have explored alternatives such as small modular reactors (SMRs), which promise lower costs and improved safety.

However, rehabilitation of the BNPP alone would require $1 billion to $2.3 billion, making it economically uncompetitive compared with the rapidly falling costs of solar-plus-storage systems (Ronin’s Grips, 2026).

Implications for current energy policy

The historical trajectory of nuclear power in the Philippines highlights three critical lessons:

Economic burden: Nuclear projects have consistently exceeded cost estimates, straining public finances.

Geological risk: Active fault lines and volcanic hazards make nuclear energy uniquely dangerous under Philippine conditions.

Governance challenges: Corruption, lack of transparency and weak regulatory oversight have undermined public trust.

Nuclear power plant costs

Construction costs

The construction of a nuclear power plant represents the single largest capital investment in the energy sector.

For a 1 GW reactor, global benchmarks place the capital cost at $6 billion to $10 billion, equivalent to $6,000 to $10,000 per kilowatt of installed capacity (Thunder Said Energy, 2025).

This figure includes the reactor core itself, estimated at $1 billion to $2 billion; the steam generator, at $100 million to $200 million; turbine systems, at $50 million to $100 million; and labor costs ranging from $500 million to $1 billion.

These costs are magnified in the Philippine context because of the need for imported technology, specialized labor and compliance with international nuclear safety standards.

Unlike coal or LNG plants, which can be built in three to five years, nuclear plants typically require eight to 12 years of construction, further increasing financing costs through interest during construction (Lee, 2025).

Thus, while nuclear power promises long-term stability, its upfront capital intensity is a major barrier for developing economies.

Operational costs

Once operational, nuclear plants incur significant recurring expenses.

Fuel costs, including uranium procurement, enrichment and fabrication, average $120 million to $250 million annually (Scott, 2026). Maintenance and repair add another $70 million to $150 million a year, while staffing and training require $25 million to $60 million annually.

In total, annual operations and maintenance (O&M) costs range from $200 million to $400 million.

Uranium fuel accounts for less than 15% of total costs, making nuclear power relatively insulated from fuel price volatility compared with LNG, where imported gas can represent 60% to 70% of total generation costs (Institute for Climate and Sustainable Cities, 2026).

However, nuclear O&M costs are higher than those of solar-plus-battery systems, which have minimal fuel costs and declining maintenance requirements.

This highlights nuclear power’s paradox: stable fuel economics but high fixed operating expenses.

Waste management scenarios

Waste management is the most politically sensitive and technically challenging aspect of nuclear power.

Three scenarios illustrate the range of costs and risks.

Cooling pools, the default option, cost $500 million to $1.3 billion over a 40-year reactor life. However, they carry high accident risk, as demonstrated by Fukushima Daiichi, where loss of cooling led to catastrophic fuel damage (Rothwell, 2021).

Dry cask storage, widely adopted in the United States and Europe, costs $500 million to $1.4 billion and presents moderate risk because it relies on passive cooling.

International export, the least politically feasible option, costs $1.2 billion to $2.4 billion. It shifts risk abroad but introduces geopolitical dependence.

For the Philippines, young geology and seismic activity make deep geological repositories impractical, leaving pools, casks or export as the viable options identified in the analysis.

Cumulative cost scenarios

When construction, operation and waste management are combined, cumulative costs rise substantially.

For a 20-year reactor life, total costs range from $6.5 billion to $11 billion with cooling pools, $6.7 billion to $11.5 billion with dry casks, and $7.2 billion to $12.2 billion with international export.

Extending reactor life to 40 years increases the totals to $7 billion to $12 billion, $7.5 billion to $12.5 billion, and $8 billion to $13 billion, respectively.

At 60 years, costs reach $7.5 billion to $13 billion, $8 billion to $14 billion, and $9 billion to $14.5 billion.

These figures demonstrate that nuclear economics are highly sensitive to lifespan assumptions. Longer lifespans improve cost amortization but magnify waste management challenges, particularly in countries without permanent repositories.

Sensitivity analysis under Philippine conditions

Economic shocks further reshape nuclear feasibility.

Peso depreciation increases costs by $50 million to $100 million for cooling pools, $100 million to $200 million for dry casks, and $200 million to $600 million for international export, reflecting the import dependence of nuclear technology.

Inflation adds $100 million to $200 million for pools, $150 million to $250 million for casks, and $50 million to $100 million for export.

Accident costs dwarf all other factors: $5 billion to $10 billion for pools, $500 million to $1 billion for casks, and $1 billion to $3 billion for export.

Insurance premiums reflect risk perception, adding $400 million to $800 million for pools, $200 million to $400 million for casks, and $800 million to $1.6 billion for export.

These figures underscore how nuclear power’s apparent stability can be undermined by accident risk and insurance burdens, particularly in a seismically active archipelago.

Comparative economics

The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) provides a standardized comparison.

Nuclear power delivers electricity at $52 to $97 per MWh, with capital costs of $6 billion to $10 billion and low fuel sensitivity, accounting for less than 15% of total costs. However, unresolved high-level waste (HLW) disposal remains a major externality.

LNG in the Philippines costs P8.8 per kWh, equivalent to $155 per MWh, with capital costs of $1.5 billion to $2.5 billion but high fuel sensitivity because of volatile imports (Institute for Climate and Sustainable Cities, 2026).

Solar-plus-battery systems now deliver electricity at $40 to $70 per MWh, with capital costs of $1 billion to $1.5 billion for solar and $250 million to $500 million for storage.

While solar power faces intermittency and land-use challenges, its declining costs and resilience make it the cheapest option in the analysis.

Thus, nuclear power is not the cheapest source of electricity under Philippine conditions. Solar-plus-battery systems are more affordable, while LNG remains the most expensive.

The analysis finds that nuclear power is not economically viable for the Philippines under current conditions.

Cooling pools, while initially the cheapest option, become the most expensive once accident risk and insurance are factored in. Dry casks offer the most balanced pathway, with higher upfront costs but lower risk exposure and manageable insurance.

International export is the most financially and politically difficult option, with costs magnified by peso depreciation and liability premiums.

Compared with LNG and solar-plus-battery systems, nuclear power’s high capital intensity and unresolved waste disposal challenges make it less competitive.

LNG is expensive and volatile, while solar-plus-battery systems are the most affordable and resilient pathway identified in the analysis.

Policymakers should prioritize renewables with storage, complemented by regional energy cooperation, rather than pursue nuclear baseload capacity under current conditions.

Nuclear power offers carbon advantages but is not a cheap source of electricity in the Philippines. Its high capital costs, unresolved waste management and fiscal risks outweigh its fuel stability.

Solar-plus-battery systems provide the most affordable and resilient pathway, while LNG remains a transitional but costly option.

Policymakers must weigh not only economic feasibility but also safety, resilience and political acceptability. In the Philippine context, renewables with storage represent the most viable strategy for energy security and climate resilience.

When farmland opportunity costs are explicitly integrated, solar-plus-battery systems remain competitive, but their economics shift upward.

For 1 GW of capacity, about 2,000 hectares of land would be required. At P1 million per hectare, direct compensation totals P2 billion, or about $36 million.

More importantly, diversified farms on this land could generate at least P1 million per hectare annually, resulting in P2 billion a year in foregone agricultural output.

Over 40 years, this would amount to P80 billion, or about $1.4 billion, and over 60 years, P120 billion, or about $2.2 billion.

Thus, the total cost of solar-plus-battery systems rises to $10.4 billion to $17.4 billion over 40 years and $14.2 billion to $26.2 billion over 60 years, translating to $14,000 to $26,000 per kilowatt.

This demonstrates that food security trade-offs must be explicitly included in energy planning (Dupraz et al., 2011; IRENA, 2022).

Nuclear power remains more expensive, with costs of $20 billion to $30 billion over 40 years and $25 billion to $35 billion over 60 years.

While nuclear power avoids direct farmland displacement, it faces unresolved high-level waste disposal and accident risks that could add $5 billion to $10 billion in liabilities (Rothwell, 2021; Thunder Said Energy, 2025).

LNG imports are the costliest pathway, reaching $40 billion to $70 billion over 40 years and $60 billion to $90 billion over 60 years, dominated by volatile fuel imports and carbon externalities (Institute for Climate and Sustainable Cities, 2026).

Solar-plus-battery systems remain the most affordable pathway even when farmland opportunity costs are included, but policymakers must weigh systemic trade-offs between energy security and food security.

Agrivoltaics, rooftop solar and cooperative land-use models could mitigate these trade-offs by allowing dual use of land and ensuring farmer participation in energy projects.

Scenario projection table: Direct and indirect costs, normalized to 1 GW

| Pathway | 20 years | 40 years | 60 years | Cost per kW |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Solar + battery, 1 GW | $6 billion-$10 billion + P40 billion, or about $720 million, in food losses = $6.7 billion-$10.7 billion | $9 billion-$16 billion + P80 billion, or about $1.4 billion, in food losses = $10.4 billion-$17.4 billion | $12 billion-$24 billion + P120 billion, or about $2.2 billion, in food losses = $14.2 billion-$26.2 billion | $14,000-$26,000 |
| Nuclear, 1 GW | $12 billion-$18 billion | $20 billion-$30 billion | $25 billion-$35 billion | $20,000-$30,000 |
| LNG, 1 GW | $25 billion-$50 billion | $40 billion-$70 billion | $60 billion-$90 billion | $25,000-$50,000 |

Characterization of nuclear and radiological waste

| Waste category | Typical sources in the Philippine context | Hazard level | Handling and disposal options |
|---|---|---|---|
| Low-level waste (LLW) | Nuclear medicine, including syringes, gloves and contaminated materials; industrial uses such as smoke detectors and gauges | Short-lived radioactivity; relatively low hazard | Compaction, incineration and shallow land burial; requires controlled but not deep geological storage |
| Intermediate- or medium-level waste (ILW) | Hospital radiology equipment, industrial sources such as cesium-137 and cobalt-60, and reactor components | Higher radioactivity; may require shielding | Encapsulation in concrete or bitumen and engineered near-surface repositories; not suitable for simple landfills |
| High-level waste (HLW) | Spent nuclear fuel from reactors | Extremely radioactive, contains long-lived isotopes and generates heat | Requires cooling pools or dry cask storage; the ultimate solution is a deep geological repository, which does not yet exist in the Philippines, the United States or Japan |

Cost of handling high-level waste in cooling pools

Since the Philippines cannot host a geological repository under the conditions identified in the analysis, the default option would be indefinite storage in spent-fuel pools at the reactor site.

Construction and maintenance of cooling pools

Initial construction would cost $100 million to $500 million, depending on reactor size and safety systems.

Pools must be lined and reinforced and equipped with continuous cooling, monitoring and radiation shielding.

Operational costs

Continuous cooling, water treatment, radiation monitoring and security would cost $10 million to $20 million a year per reactor.

Labor, regulatory compliance and emergency preparedness would add to recurring costs.

Lifetime costs

Over a 40-year reactor lifespan, pool storage alone could cost $400 million to $800 million.

This excludes the eventual transfer of spent fuel to dry casks, which cost $1 million to $2 million each, with hundreds required for a GW-scale reactor.

Policy and risk notes

• Indefinite storage risk:Pools are not designed for permanent disposal. Long-term reliance increases accident vulnerability, as illustrated by concerns involving the Fukushima Daiichi spent-fuel pools.
• NIMBY effect:Even low-level repositories face opposition, as in Gatarran, Cagayan. HLW storage would be politically more difficult.
• Global precedent:The United States’ Yucca Mountain project and Japan’s experience show that even advanced economies struggle with HLW disposal.
• Philippine limitation:Young geology and seismic risks make deep repositories impractical. Thus, on-site pool storage remains the only feasible option identified in the analysis unless spent fuel is exported under costly international agreements.

Handling HLW in cooling pools would cost hundreds of millions of dollars upfront and tens of millions annually, totaling nearly $1 billion over a plant’s lifetime.

It is technically feasible but politically fragile because it would leave the country with indefinite storage and no final disposal solution.

Comparative economics and risks of HLW management

The analysis compares three main HLW management options: continued cooling-pool storage, a transition to dry cask storage, and international export.

| Option | Technical description | Capital and operating costs | Risks and limitations | Policy and political feasibility |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cooling-pool storage, on-site | Spent fuel stored in water-filled pools at the reactor site; requires active cooling and monitoring | Construction: $100 million-$500 million per pool; O&M: $10 million-$20 million a year; 40-year lifetime: $400 million-$800 million | Vulnerable to power loss, as at Fukushima; pools are not designed for indefinite storage; high security requirements | Most common global interim solution; politically feasible but fragile because of NIMBY concerns and accident fears |
| Dry cask storage, on-site | After five to 10 years of cooling in pools, fuel is transferred to sealed steel and concrete casks stored above ground | $1 million-$2 million per cask; hundreds needed per GW reactor; total: $500 million-$1 billion over reactor life | Safer than pools because of passive cooling; still an interim, not permanent, solution; requires a secure site and monitoring | Widely used in the United States, Europe and Japan; more acceptable than pools but still faces local opposition |
| International export, out of country | Spent fuel shipped to another country with a repository or reprocessing facility | Transport: $1 million-$2 million per shipment; long-term contracts: potentially $1 billion-$2 billion over 40 years; insurance and liability costs are high | Political dependence on host country; accident risks during transport; requires bilateral or multilateral treaties | Rarely feasible because few countries accept foreign HLW; faces strong opposition from sending and receiving states |

Cooling pools are the cheapest option initially but are the most vulnerable over the long term.

Dry casks cost more upfront but reduce accident risk and are globally preferred for interim storage.

International export is the most expensive and politically complex option, but it bypasses the geological limitations identified for the Philippines.

The expanded scenario model shows cumulative costs under different reactor lifespans of 20, 40 and 60 years and contrasts accident-risk probabilities. The model is intended to help policymakers weigh economic feasibility against safety and resilience.

Scenario model: HLW management pathways

| Option | 20-year reactor life | 40-year reactor life | 60-year reactor life | Accident-risk profile |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cooling-pool storage | Construction: $100 million-$500 million; O&M: $200 million-$400 million; total: $300 million-$900 million | O&M: $400 million-$800 million; total: $500 million-$1.3 billion | O&M: $600 million-$1.2 billion; total: $700 million-$1.7 billion | High risk: pools are vulnerable to power loss, seismic events and terrorism; accident probability estimated at about 1%-2% per decade based on global incidents |
| Dry cask storage | Transition after 10 years; 200-300 casks: $200 million-$600 million; O&M: $50 million-$100 million; total: $250 million-$700 million | 400-600 casks: $400 million-$1.2 billion; O&M: $100 million-$200 million; total: $500 million-$1.4 billion | 600-900 casks: $600 million-$1.8 billion; O&M: $150 million-$300 million; total: $750 million-$2.1 billion | Moderate risk: passive cooling and less accident-prone; accident probability estimated at about 0.2%-0.5% per decade |
| International export | Transport contracts: $500 million-$1 billion; insurance and liability: $100 million-$200 million; total: $600 million-$1.2 billion | Long-term contracts: $1 billion-$2 billion; insurance: $200 million-$400 million; total: $1.2 billion-$2.4 billion | Extended contracts: $1.5 billion-$3 billion; insurance: $300 million-$600 million; total: $1.8 billion-$3.6 billion | Low domestic risk because waste leaves the Philippines, but high geopolitical risk because of dependence on the host country and treaty fragility; transport accident probability estimated at about 0.1%-0.3% per decade |

Insights for policymakers

• Cooling pools are the cheapest option initially but the most dangerous over the long term.
• Dry casks balance cost and safety and are widely adopted globally as an interim storage solution.
• International export is the safest option domestically but is the most politically and financially difficult.
• The accident-risk probabilities illustrate why transitioning from pools to casks is considered a global best practice for interim storage.

The sensitivity analysis expands the scenario model by factoring in Philippine economic conditions, including currency depreciation, inflation, accident costs and insurance premiums.

Sensitivity scenario model: HLW management pathways under Philippine conditions

| Factor | Cooling-pool storage | Dry cask storage | International export |
|---|---|---|---|
| Currency depreciation, peso to U.S. dollar | Import-dependent equipment and chemicals; a 20% peso depreciation raises O&M costs by about $50 million-$100 million over 40 years | Cask imports involving steel and concrete are highly sensitive; a 20% depreciation adds about $100 million-$200 million over 40 years | Contracts denominated in U.S. dollars; peso depreciation magnifies costs by 20%-30%, or $200 million-$600 million over 40 years |
| Domestic inflation | Labor, utilities and chemicals increase O&M costs; 5% annual inflation adds about $100 million-$200 million over 40 years | Construction inflation raises cask fabrication and site-preparation costs, adding about $150 million-$250 million over 40 years | Less sensitive domestically; inflation mainly affects logistics and port handling, adding about $50 million-$100 million |
| Worst-case accident costs | Pool accident involving loss of cooling or seismic damage; cleanup and compensation: $5 billion-$10 billion, based on the Fukushima precedent | A cask breach is rare, but sabotage or a seismic event could lead to cleanup costs of $500 million-$1 billion | A transport accident involving a ship or port could produce cleanup and liability costs of $1 billion-$3 billion |
| Insurance premiums | High premiums because of accident risk; about $10 million-$20 million a year, or $400 million-$800 million over 40 years | Lower premiums because of passive safety; about $5 million-$10 million a year, or $200 million-$400 million over 40 years | Very high premiums because of international liability; about $20 million-$40 million a year, or $800 million-$1.6 billion over 40 years |

Sensitivity results

• Peso depreciation disproportionately affects dry cask and export options because both rely heavily on imported materials or U.S. dollar-denominated contracts.
• Inflation erodes O&M budgets across all options, but cooling pools are most exposed because of continuous chemical, utility and labor requirements.
• Accident costs dwarf all other factors. Even a single pool accident could exceed $10 billion, far outweighing savings from lower upfront costs.
• Insurance premiums act as a proxy for risk perception. International export carries the highest premiums because of cross-border liability, while dry casks benefit from lower premiums because of passive safety.

Cooling pools appear cheapest until accident risk and insurance are factored in, after which they become the most expensive option.

Dry casks provide the most balanced pathway, with higher upfront costs but lower risk exposure and manageable insurance.

International export is the most financially and politically difficult option, with costs magnified by peso depreciation and liability premiums.

Nuclear power is not cheap under Philippine conditions. Although it offers carbon advantages, it is not economically viable for the Philippines under the conditions examined because of high capital costs, unresolved waste management and fiscal risks.

Policymakers should prioritize renewables with storage, complemented by regional energy cooperation, rather than pursue nuclear baseload capacity under current conditions.

How to produce Pax Silica’s 3 GW power requirement without nuclear

Quantitative combinations of solar-plus-battery systems and LNG plants were calculated to determine how Pax Silica’s 3 GW demand could be supplied reliably.

Three main scenarios — renewable-heavy, balanced and LNG-heavy — were examined, and their costs, risks and feasibility under Philippine conditions were compared.

For Pax Silica’s 3 GW demand, the optimal design identified in the analysis is 2 GW of solar-plus-battery systems and 1 GW of LNG baseload capacity.

This mix balances affordability, reliability and climate resilience.

Policymakers should prioritize renewable-heavy embedded generation while using LNG as transitional support. Nuclear power should remain a last-resort option, pursued only if renewable expansion fails.

Land-use benchmarks for solar PV

Utility-scale solar typically requires seven to 12 hectares per MW, depending on panel efficiency, spacing and whether single-axis trackers are used (IRENA, 2022).

For conservative Philippine conditions, including flat land, maintenance spacing and trackers, the analysis uses 10 hectares per MW as a baseline.

Land requirement calculations

For 1 GW of solar PV:

1 GW = 1,000 MW

1,000 MW × 10 hectares per MW = 10,000 hectares

For 2 GW of solar PV:

2 GW = 2,000 MW

2,000 MW × 10 hectares per MW = 20,000 hectares

Comparison with Pax Silica’s lease

Available land: 1,600 hectares.

Required land for 1 GW of solar: about 10,000 hectares, or roughly six times the available area.

Required land for 2 GW of solar: about 20,000 hectares, or roughly 12 times the available area.

Pax Silica’s 1,600-hectare lease therefore cannot accommodate even 1 GW of conventional ground-mounted solar power.

Implications

• On-site solar limit:Within 1,600 hectares, Pax Silica could realistically accommodate about 160 MW of solar capacity, assuming 10 hectares per MW.
• Remaining demand:To reach 2 GW of solar capacity, Pax Silica must rely on off-site solar farms in Central Luzon or adopt agrivoltaics and rooftop solar to reduce the land footprint.

Design adjustment

On-site: About 160 MW of solar power plus battery storage.

Off-site: About 1.84 GW of solar power plus battery storage on leased land elsewhere under a cooperative model.

LNG: 1 GW of embedded baseload capacity inside New Clark City.

Regional solar farms

DOE can designate nearby provinces, including Tarlac, Pampanga and Nueva Ecija, for cooperative solar expansion tied to Pax Silica’s grid.

Hybrid LNG-solar strategy

Given the land limitations, LNG baseload capacity becomes more critical in balancing the shortfall.

With only 1,600 hectares, Pax Silica cannot accommodate 1 GW to 2 GW of solar capacity on-site.

The renewable-heavy mix of 2 GW of solar power and 1 GW of LNG capacity remains the optimal design identified in the analysis, but it requires about 160 MW of on-site solar within Pax Silica’s lease, 1.84 GW of off-site solar farms in Central Luzon, and 1 GW of embedded LNG baseload capacity inside New Clark City.

This hybrid design balances land constraints, affordability and reliability while keeping nuclear power as a last-resort option. /dm