With the confusing turmoil in the mideast erupting erratically without any clear outcome or timeline, the question arises - what will the power balances look like in the end? Currently, President Trump has agreed to provide the Saudis with nuclear technology under US protection. Meanwhile, the Houthis in Yemen have made a mockery of the Saudi alternative to Hormuz, namely the Red Sea port of Bab el Mandab. Through there flows some 4% of the world’s oil normally.

Meanwhile, Iran is taking a hammering and the Saudis launch repeated airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. They’ve been doing that for years yet the Houthis are still able to fire ballistic and other missiles at Saudi oil infrastructure. Thus far the US has not been able to protect its Gulf allies from harm. So how will it all play out - on a map seething with rivalries, shifting alliances and realignments?

Currently, the chief beneficiary seems to be Turkey and Erdogan. And the Israelis are not taking that kindly. Let us specify. As the Shiite arc of alliance weakens from Iran to Lebanon due to the US/Israeli depredation of Tehran’s power, Sunni states look set to fill the vacuum. Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman dream world is slowly materializing. The diplomatic and security pact announced early this year between Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi, aka the ‘R4’, promises a Sunni arc of solidarity to displace the Shiite one.

Two quick observations. Pakistan’s inclusion opened the door to nuclear technology transfer from there to the Saudis. Doubtless that is what prompted President Trump to intercede and offer a US substitute. That agreement soon unravelled with Trump making new conditions in public and the Saudis repudiating them. Still, Riyadh is now effectively held back from getting Pak nuke tech and probably even American too.

Meanwhile, Erdogan and the Saudis don’t agree on who should lead the Sunni world. Indeed they’re rivalrous on the matter because Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman vision places Turkey at the center of Sunnism going south to Arabia and north to Central Asia whereas the Saudis see themselves as the inheritors of Mecca and the prophet.

Notable here is the non-participation of any Central Asian or Turkic states in R4, despite all being Sunni and in theory part of any geo-historical Ottoman revival. Why the absence? They’re highly sensitive to any destabilizing religious fervor, being affected by Afghanistan nearby. And they have good relations with both India and Israel, the latter having close ties to Azerbaijan. Plus India is the only non-Chinese influenced eastward trading option for the Turkic ‘Stans. (China practically owns Pakistan’s ports.) The 'Stans want to maximize trade and stay out of geopolitical rivalries. So the Turkic states will keep out of Middle East affairs.

How efficacious does the Sunni crescent look otherwise? Promising at first glance but with caveats. Do not expect any direct conflict between Iran and Türkiye. Both countries depend on each other to stifle Kurdish separatism. Put another way, each can destabilize the other by enabling the others’ Kurds. But that still leaves room aplenty for rivalry. Turkey has effectively put Syria under the Ottoman revival umbrella already. Syria used to be a kind of Iranian satrapy in the Assad era.

Now it’s a matter of re-orienting Iraq away from Iranian dominance. Here, the influence of illicit funding plays a central role. Just as Tehran funded Shiite militias in Iraq and Lebanon, Ankara has been meeting quietly with Iraqi tribes and Kurds to replace patronage by the Mullahs in Iran. Meanwhile, the relatively new Iraqi Prime Minister has shifted the economic balance with a massive anti-corruption campaign that will shake loose the pro-Iranian grip on the country’s finances. Here’s an article outlining how the graft crackdown melds with anti-militia crackdowns.

Thus far the amounts confiscated exceed $100 millions worth. Add to this the Iraqi PM’s recent meeting with Trump in the White House and balances will begin to shift in Baghdad - not least because pro-Iranian militias were involved in rocketing US bases in the latest US-Iran hostilities. None of this re-orientation will happen smoothly, peaceably or overnight. But the general trend is already palpable in the region.

There are limits and red lines that will keep Erdogan’s ambitions in check unless he wants his country to end up like Iran. As mentioned above, he has repeatedly shown public support for Hamas in myriad ways (hosting leaders etc) and raised hackles in Israel. Which has responded by reinforcing its contacts with the Kurds and above all by intensifying its budding alliance with Greece and Greek Cyprus - including military exercises and the sharing of advanced weapons.

There are limits to Israel’s options too. After all, Türkiye is a member of Nato. Moreover, Greek society as a whole tends to be rather left-leaning and traditionally sympathetic to the Arab side. So the strategic deals, thus far anyway, are happening among the elites without much vocal enthusiasm from the street. Having common enemies doesn’t always create the warmest friendships.

In some ways, the situation resembles Israel-Armenian relations. Israel’s recent offer to pass an explicit Armenian Genocide recognition law met with distrust in Armenia itself. This after many years of alienation between the two countries and Armenia’s newfound detente with Turkey. Moreover Jewish and Eastern Christian frictions go back deep into the Ottoman era, jockeying for the Sultan’s favor in the millet system.

Most mystifying - at least to Washington - is the constant unravelling of Iran-US deals. The US has offered all manner of concessions to no effect. Keep power, keep money and oil flow, no regime change, a return in effect to JCPOA nuclear conditions, trade with the west - and yet Tehran won’t ceasefire or stop provocations. They don’t get the message and the White House can’t understand why. They’ve even been quietly told that a Shiite regional resurgence could follow (as a way to counter Erdogan) only no nukes and no threat to Israel.

Why won’t Tehran buy it? A myriad of reasons. Internal factionalism. A conviction that Trump is vulnerable (midterms etc). Suffering will unite the populace with the regime. Maximalist notions of grandeur going back to ancient times. Successful damage to US alliances. Veto over oil trading waterways. Decades-long deep seated distrust of Israel and US. Promises of support from Russia and China, thus far very effective. Martyrdom ideology. Contained, stable, Iran will lead to regime overthrow. Take your pick.

In short, Iran will not back down in the near future. But its throw-weight will diminish in the region inexorably as economic leverage wanes. Erdogan’s star will continue to rise - up to a point. He is 72 and ailing with no clear successor. He is unlikely to win another election fairly as the bad economy and high inflation alienates the public. Turkey will benefit from oil and gas through-flow with direct regional supply lines crashing. But not in time to save him ultimately from Orban-esque outcomes. As the US loses influence regionally, under Erdogan Ankara will increasingly embrace Beijing.