Some thoughts on Marcos’ 5th Sona (2)

Cotabato City—In this seat of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), constituents here were eagerly awaiting what President Marcos had to say in his fifth State of the Nation Address (Sona) about the current and future directions of this region.

Last week, I ended my column with a question on whether the current worrisome state of political dynamics and the fate of the peace process of the region will merit some ample time in his fifth Sona.

In this city, many civil society leaders, including some politicians, perceive that the current sad state of this fledgling region has been the outcome of presidential interference, carried out through alleged scheming movers of Marcos’ interlocutors and advisers. One of these unpleasant outcomes is the temporary halt in the ongoing procedures to complete various components of the normalization process, an integral part of the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro that gave rise to the creation of the BARMM in 2019.

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Like many of my friends and colleagues who have been longtime advocates and supporters of this quite painstaking process that shaped what this region has become, I was hugely disappointed. Mr. Marcos spent less than a minute uttering some very vague and “praise-release” words in the one or two sentences devoted to describing the state of the BARMM.

Not a word about how to address the massive political upheavals in the region starting in late 2024 and early 2025. Not even an expression as to why there had been a significant lull in the implementation of the normalization process that is integral to moving toward an exit agreement required in any peace accord signed by a government and a former rebel group.

But about a week before his fifth Sona, Mr. Marcos visited the BARMM on July 22, 2026.

His visit was received quite warmly by the current top leadership, including the governors and mayors of the region’s member provinces. Mr. Marcos swooped down on the region like an exalted sovereign distributing manna from national coffers, a windfall of P3.4 billion.

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In the press releases and various statements after Mr. Marcos’ visit, such a huge amount is to be spent on efforts toward a National Convergence Program that will bring together efforts of the national “Bawat Bayan Makikinabang” and the regional “Mas Matatag na Bangsamoro” programs purportedly designed to bring “essential services to the communities.”

The P3.4 billion also included an allocation of P200,000 per barangay in the region under the Socio-Civic Projects Fund, to be split equally for educational/presidential scholarships and local community priorities.

But the timing of his visit—July 22, 2026—was quite dubious. The very first parliamentary elections are scheduled for Sept. 14, 2025. This is less than two months before voters in the region would select their regular parliamentarians, representing different districts of its five-member provinces.

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In subsequent social media posts, several civil society groups mentioned that out of this windfall, local chief executives (governors, mostly) also received their share of P50 million each.

But such a windfall, provided at a time when an approaching major regional poll is to be conducted, can be interpreted in many ways, especially in a region that has always been characterized by patronage politics since its predecessor—the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao—was created in 1987.

We also need to scrutinize how the implementation of “national-regional convergence” works in such a highly politically charged nature (patron-client relationship) of national and regional political dynamics.

Just exactly what kind of “convergence” does the national government led by Mr. Marcos want from the region? Will this mean that the region’s new leaders, whom Mr. Marcos had appointed to replace senior Moro Islamic Liberation Front leaders starting in March 2025, assent to the leadership of his national-based Federalist Party? What would this mean to the Bangsamoro people’s deep desire to achieve genuine political self-determination if the pecuniary favors are used as leverage to ensure a sweeping victory of the regional counterpart of Mr. Marcos’ political party?

And why the fixation on titling government programs with acronyms that correspond to current political leaders—e.g., Bawat Bayan Makikinabang, or BBM? Is there no other way to term such a program? Will it really mean that all communities in the BARMM will benefit from this windfall?

What about the “Mas Matatag Bangsamoro” framework—what does it mean exactly? Why call it “mas matatag” when at this stage, there is so much transition and untoward incidents taking place that it is almost impossible to refer to the region as “matatag” (stable) in the first place?

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