The Serbian flag flies next to a statue on the roof of the Serbian Government building in Belgrade. Serbia, Sunday, June 1, 2025 (Photo by Danil Shamkin/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
NurPhoto via Getty Images
You might have missed it, but last week American policy toward the Western Balkans took a meaningful step forward. On July 17th, Serbian Foreign Minister Marko Djuric and Secretary of State Marco Rubio formally launched a strategic dialogue between their two countries. The initiative has been more than a year in the making, and while details remain scant, the potential stakes for the Trump administration are significant—for at least four reasons.
The first is energy security. The Trump administration has rightly made Western Balkan energy diversification a priority. Building on last Fall’s Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation Ministerial in Athens, the U.S. has joined Bulgaria, Greece, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine in advancing the Vertical Gas Corridor — a north-south route designed to bring U.S. LNG and Azerbaijani gas into Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, thereby reducing the continent’s lingering dependence on Russian energy. Serbia has a major part to play in these plans, because it sits along the route and already has the infrastructure to become a key energy transit hub. Moreover, Belgrade is now building gas interconnectors to Romania and North Macedonia that will enable greater imports of non-Russian supplies.
That’s a decidedly big deal, since Russia’s state-owned GAZPROM energy conglomerate currently holds a controlling stake in NIS, Serbia’s national oil company. In recent years, Russia has used NIS as a geopolitical tool to fund a range of malign influence operations in Serbia, from fomenting protests to fueling anti-American propaganda. As part of broader measures targeting Russia’s energy sector, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on NIS last October, and that pressure has produced results: in January, Hungarian energy firm MOL stepped in and inked an agreement to acquire the Russian stake, although that deal has faced delays since. Still, the Serbian government seems serious about breaking this dependency; its 2026 budget, adopted back in December, allocates 164 billion dinars (approximately $1.6 billion) for energy security — funds that could be used to nationalize NIS if the Russians end up refusing to sell.
Stepped up strategic dialogue with Washington can help accelerate this transition and lock Serbia into U.S. and Western energy supply chains, thereby stripping Moscow of one of its most effective remaining geopolitical levers in the Balkans.
The second is strategic minerals. Although it’s not widely known, Serbia possesses Europe’s largest lithium reserves. The Jadar deposit in western Serbia, for instance, ranks among the most significant in the world, estimated to be capable of meeting as much as 90% of Europe's current lithium needs. Serbia has committed to developing these reserves with Europe rather than with China, formalizing a strategic partnership with the EU on raw materials and battery value chains in 2024 and thereafter securing Jadar’s inclusion as a key site in the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act.
These steps reflect deliberate choices by the Serbian government to anchor its most valuable strategic resource in the Western supply chain, rather than in China’s. It’s a trend that should be encouraged, because Washington has a direct interest in making sure global lithium supply is diversified away from Beijing.
The third is defense modernization. Serbia is actively modernizing its military, acquiring fighter jets from France, transport aircraft from Spain, helicopters from Germany, and a range of systems from Israel. Yet successive administrations in Washington have historically been cautious about selling American arms to Belgrade, partly due to objections from regional neighbors. Increasingly, though, this caution is counterproductive, since a Serbian military equipped with U.S. systems would be more interoperable with NATO, more transparent, and more oriented toward Western standards rather than Russian ones.
Finally, there is Serbia’s growing value as a Middle East partner. Belgrade has emerged as a reliable friend to two key U.S. allies: Israel and the UAE. Serbia was one of the only European countries to provide Israel with meaningful military support after October 7, 2023, and that policy has continued despite pressure from other European states. As a result, ties between the two countries have blossomed, with concrete dividends for both. For instance, Israeli defense contractor Elbit Systems is now building a $2 billion drone manufacturing facility in Serbia — one of its only such facilities outside of Israel.
The Emirates, meanwhile, has become one of Serbia’s most important non-European partners. Over the past decade-and-a-half, it has poured substantial investments into the country, kick-starting projects ranging from renewable energy to digital infrastructure. This cooperation has delivered clear benefits for Belgrade, while giving Abu Dhabi a strategic foothold in the Balkans to better counter regional rivals such as Turkey.
All of which makes Serbia a useful force multiplier for U.S. priorities in the Middle East at a time when the Trump administration is actively questioning the commitment of many of its other continental partners.
Last week’s launch of the strategic dialogue between Washington and Belgrade helps to advance all four fronts. What comes next, in terms of concrete deliverables on energy, strategic minerals, defense and regional partnerships, will determine whether the current opening translates into lasting strategic gains for the United States in the Western Balkans.